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Abstract
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on repression in developing nations
is still disputed. Some argue that FDI improves economic development and
exports human rights values. Others criticise the exploitation of cheap labour and
resources, which may lead to tensions and government oppression. Previous
studies have employed aggregate FDI data, with conflicting results. Alternatively,
I propose that the e↵ects depend on what kind of FDI enters a country. I build a
sectoral framework to discuss how skills and technology levels, as well as the
motivation for FDI, can mediate the impact. I then examine the link in a panel
data analysis (1983-2010) in 121 countries, integrating sectoral FDI in several
resource, manufacturing and service industries. The results show that investment
in high-skilled and -tech sectors has positive e↵ects. The results are robust across
several measures for repression, and when accounting for sector size, regional and
time e↵ects.
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In recent decades, investment made by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the
developing world has risen enormously.1 In 2013, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
to developing countries reached a new high and accounted for 54 per cent of global
inflows (UNCTAD 2014:xiii). The poorest of these nations depend mainly on FDI for
capital formation (UNCTAD 2011), and many host countries aim to attract even more
FDI to improve their economy and the well-being of their citizens. The e↵ects of such
investment, however, have been subject to controversy. On the one hand, the
‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1990; 2000) states that the liberalisation of trade
and FDI can stimulate economic development by bringing new skills and know-how to
host countries, and thereby lead to a decrease in repression and improved rights
protection (Landman and Carvalho 2010). However, critics argue that rising FDI
penetration did not bring the expected economic stimuli to developing countries (Stiglitz
2002; Rodrik 2006; Chang 2010). Instead, many foreign investors are repeatedly accused
of exploiting resources and cheap labour, fuelling tensions, and supporting repressive
regimes (Klein 2000; Christian Aid 2004). After three decades of statistical analyses on
e↵ects of FDI on governments’ human rights violations, cross-national studies still
produce conflicting results. Some find that overall FDI has a positive e↵ect on rights
protection (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Apodaca 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005), while
others conclude that there is no significant e↵ect whatsoever (Mitchell and McCormick
1988; Minkler and Sweeney 2011; Sorens and Ruger 2012; Cao et al. 2013), and that
negative e↵ects seem di cult to establish (Smith et al. 1999). A common feature of all
these studies is that they enter aggregate FDI data into their statistical analyses.
However, treating FDI as a lump sum means that changes in the composition of FDI
over time and its significant variation across countries are ignored. Far too little
attention has been paid to the industries in which FDI is located, even though the
international business literature has repeatedly pointed out that FDI is highly
sector-specific (e.g. Gilpin 1987:233), and a disaggregation of investment data provides
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“a better depiction of reality” (Cohen 2007:183).
This article provides a new theoretical framework that demonstrates how industry
characteristics can mediate FDI e↵ects. Drawing from international business theories
(Dunning and Lundan 2008; Gilpin 1987; Cohen 2007), it discusses how the motivation
for investment, skills levels and the use of technology di↵er across industries, and how
this can influence rights protection. I test the sectoral framework in a panel data
analysis including up to 121 developing countries over three decades (1983 to 2010). Ten
types of FDI are employed: extractive (petroleum, mining), manufacturing (food,
fabricated metals, chemical, electrical, machinery and transport equipment), and service
(wholesale trade, depository institutions) investment. I find that FDI e↵ects vary
according to industry sectors. FDI is positively connected to rights outcomes when
medium- or high-skilled workers and technology are present. Sectors with low skills and
technology levels tend to have negative e↵ects. In addition, while the motivation for
investment such as resource extraction or the exploitation of cheap labour may have
some influence on rights outcomes, skills and technology levels remain the driving force
behind FDI e↵ects.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next section starts by defining
repression and then assess the previous literature. In the central section, I discuss how
industry-specific e↵ects can shape the impact of FDI on repression before testing this
link empirically in a cross-country panel-data analysis. The conclusion outlines the
implications of these findings for future research.
Previous Literature
Government repression is the deployment of physical sanctions by a state against an
individual or group within its territorial jurisdiction to deter activities challenging the
government (Davenport 2007; Davenport and Inman 2012). Human rights scholars have
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argued that levels of such repression are directly reflected in the violations of personal
integrity rights (Richards et al. 2001; Sorens and Ruger 2012; Young 2009). Personal
integrity rights are defined as the protection from torture, extrajudicial killing,
disappearance, and political imprisonment. In the literature on the e↵ects of FDI on
repression and human rights, much attention has been paid to the violation of these
particular rights, since they are essential to the security and dignity of the person, and
qualify as fundamental human rights (Apodaca 2001). Reflecting the importance of
these rights, scholars have devoted considerable e↵orts (see Landman and Carvalho
2010) to developing coding schemes that quantify annual country reports published by
Amnesty International or the U.S. State Department to measure repression and personal
integrity rights protection, e.g. the Cingranelli and Richards Indices, the Political Terror
Scale, and a relatively new measurement which is based on such indices, the Latent
Human Rights Protection Scores by Fariss (2014).2
Using these indices, a range of studies have provided important insights into domestic
and international factors that influence rights violations and repression. There is
common agreement that conflict and population size negatively a↵ect rights protection,
while democracy levels, trade and economic development have positive e↵ects (Landman
2006). However, when it comes to FDI, the literature has produced “inconsistent,
erratic, or negligible results” (Minkler and Sweeney 2011:387). In fact, such is the
degree of disagreement among scholars that many studies describe two opposing schools
of thought (e.g. Meyer 1998; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards et al. 2001;
Apodaca 2001; Kim and Trumbore 2010). Following such narratives, the anti-FDI
perspective assumes that globalisation and the liberalisation of markets, including rising
FDI flows, have maintained and aggravated the structural dependence and exploitation
of the developing world (see Hymer 1979; Smith et al. 1999; Wimberley 1990; Moran
1978). Firm activities might create wealth for some small groups, but others remain
impoverished, thereby creating ‘islands of development’ and inequality, which can lead
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to tensions among citizens (Apodaca 2001). To provide for a stable investment
environment, governments may resort to repressive acts, sanctions and coercive
behaviour to suppress such unrest and control the ‘masses’ (Hymer 1979; Smith et al.
1999). In some cases, firms have also become directly complicit in such repressive acts
by governments (Wettstein 2010; Ruggie 2011). For example, the oil multinationals
Shell and Chevron have been accused of relying on state security forces to manage
disputes with local populations in the 1990s, thereby becoming complicit in torture,
killing and imprisonment of protesters.3 The anti-FDI school of thought therefore
concludes that by fuelling tensions and by providing capital to repressive host
governments, multinational corporations ‘invest’ in repression (Meyer 1998). Many
studies advance this negative perspective on FDI and rights, but there is little statistical
evidence for a systematic pattern.4
In contrast, the pro-FDI school of thought makes the basic assumption that foreign
investors improve economic development and export human rights values to developing
countries, both of which, in turn, improve human rights protection. Economic
development is boosted by the introduction and transfer of new technologies, skills and
know-how to the host economy. MNCs create jobs and lead to more e↵ective economic
activity (Howard-Hassmann 2010:43). Being “the engine of economic development”
(Apodaca 2001:590), MNCs therefore foster modernisation, long-term growth and GDP.
Improved economic development, in turn, has positive e↵ects on rights protection, as
countless studies have shown (see Landman 2006). With less economic scarcity and
better living standards, political stability can improve, which reduces the need for
governments to use repressive behaviour (Davenport 2007; Hafner-Burton 2005; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988). In addition, economic development can lead to the creation of a
strong middle class, which will expect better government protection of rights (Lipset
1959). Finally, foreign firms may directly contribute to the di↵usion of human rights
values to host countries through their day-to-day interactions with employees, customers,
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business partners and local communities. The often cited ‘human rights export’
argument (Spar 1998) states that multinational corporations export human rights values
out of self-interest, e.g. to prevent negative press. By initiating the country-wide spread
of rights protection standards to host countries and their governments, MNCs act as a
“powerful instrument in the pursuit of human rights” (Spar 1998:12).5 Supporting these
proposed e↵ects of economic development and human rights di↵usion, a range of
cross-country analyses find a positive e↵ect of FDI on rights protection (Cingranelli and
Richards 1999; Apodaca 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005; Kim and Trumbore 2010).
However, other studies conclude that, in fact, there is no significant e↵ect of FDI on
state repression and rights violations (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Smith et al. 1999;
Minkler and Sweeney 2011; Sorens and Ruger 2012; Cao et al. 2013). To sum up, the
review of the literature shows that there are convincing theoretical arguments for both
the positive and negative view of FDI, but there remains a mixed bag of statistical
evidence.
In order to move the debate forward, this study builds a new framework which examines
di↵erent types of FDI and their impact. For example, positive transfers from foreign
investors to host countries which lead to economic development are more likely in
high-skilled forms of FDI. Human rights export is more likely to occur in types of
investment where foreign a liates are well integrated into the host society and build
lasting relationships on the ground. Similarly, not all types of investment create islands
of development with the potential to create tensions and subsequent repressive acts by
governments. These points are made implicitly in many studies, but no study actually
tests the e↵ects of di↵erent types of FDI on rights, relying instead on lump sum
measures which produce conflicting results. Many human rights scholars have therefore
called for an analysis across industry sectors. For example, Kim and Trumbore
(2010:732) stated that “human rights behaviour of multinationals may vary depending
on sectoral di↵erences”, and Apodaca (2002:902) suspected that “the sector invested in,
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determines whether foreign investment is beneficial for host countries.” The next section
will incorporate information about FDI in di↵erent industry sectors.
Bringing in a Sectoral View
In each of the traditional explanations for e↵ects of FDI on repression—economic
development, human rights export, and, from a negative perspective, tensions arising
from FDI—certain underlying conditions must be met for these mechanisms to work.
This study draws from international business studies (e.g. Dunning and Lundan 2008;
Cohen 2007), arguing that two important features of industries are crucial: (1) skills and
technology levels and (2) the motivation for FDI. Each industry, such as finance FDI or
petrol FDI, has a di↵erent set-up of these characteristics, which can impact the
FDI-repression link.
Skills and Technology Levels
Many of the positive or negative e↵ects of FDI can be shaped by skills and technology
levels, in particular the economic development mechanism. The positive impact of FDI
is often explained by transfer e↵ects of worker skills, technology, know-how and
managerial practices (Keller 2002; Brown et al. 2003; Dunning and Lundan 2008;
De Mello 1999), which foster economic productivity, e ciency, and economic
development (UNCTAD 1999; 2001; OECD 2002). Wealthier countries tend to protect
human rights better (Landman 2006), which could be due to the fact that they may
have more resources to provide for rights protection. There may also be less unrest when
living standards rise, and in particular worker protests and tensions in local
communities may be alleviated because employees in high-skilled sectors receive higher
wages (Moran 2006; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001) and enjoy better working conditions
(Moran 2006:10, 41). In addition, economic development can create political stability
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and higher living standards, thereby fostering the creation of a middle class, which is
generally believed to be more educated and aware of its interests and can demand better
protection of rights (Howard-Hassmann 2010; Richards et al. 2001; Meyer 1996;
Hafner-Burton 2005). In similar ways, the di↵usion of human rights values is more
plausible for sectors with a higher skilled and educated work force. Value di↵usion can
take place in the form of labour migration from the foreign a liate to domestic firms,
across the general workforce, and in lively exchanges and long-term relationships with
suppliers, competitors, local communities and the wider society (OECD 2002).
In contrast, in low-skilled, low-tech or labour intensive industries, such as the
production of textiles or in the natural-resource sectors, exploitative investment
strategies include extremely low wages, long work hours and mandatory overtime,
unreasonable fines and punishments, inadequate health or social security benefits and
unhealthy workplace conditions (ILO 2008; Amengual and Milberg 2008; Moran 2002;
2006; Romero 1995). Similarly, in low-tech industries we might not expect large positive
spillover e↵ects on the economy. Similarly, in industries exploiting low-skilled workers a
di↵usion of human rights would surely not take place. Worse still, exploitation of
low-skilled, abundant labour can generate tensions in the host country, which means
that governments may have to resort to repressive acts.
Investment Motivation
International business research commonly distinguishes between three main motivations
of FDI: (1) natural resource-seeking, (2) market-seeking, and (3) e ciency-seeking
(Dunning and Lundan 2008; Cohen 2007; UNCTAD 2005).
Natural resource-seeking FDI is concerned with extracting resources such as oil or
minerals. Decisions to invest are mainly determined by geology and climate,
infrastructure and accessibility of materials in the host country (Cohen 2007; Sachs and
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Sauvant 2009). Such investment often takes place in the African continent and is aimed
at exporting the output to industrialised countries. MacDonald and McLaughlin (2003)
highlight that company-host community relations in the resource-seeking industries are
often characterised by a lack of societal integration of MNCs. Firms subscribe to a ‘silo
mentality’ with an inward focus, exploitative strategies, and few attempts at integration.
Exploitative strategies mixed with a lack of societal integration can lead to escalations
of misunderstandings with local communities, which can create tensions and unrest,
such as in the Niger Delta, where government security forces violated personal integrity
rights of anti-MNC activists and local protesters (Idemudia 2009; MacDonald and
McLaughlin 2003). In fact, negative discussions about FDI as a whole have often been
based on “alleged callous disregard for the peoples of host countries” in resource
concentrated areas (Cohen 2007:66).
In contrast, market-seeking FDI, such as banking and other service sectors, aims to
access a foreign market to sell products or services (UNCTAD 2005). While many
landlocked least developed countries with small market sizes such as Azerbaijan, Chad
and Nepal still struggle to attract market-seeking FDI (UNCTAD 2010:66), India and
China’s growing domestic markets have led to significant investments in recent years
(UNCTAD 2007:42). Market-seeking FDI adapts products to suit existing cultures and
language (UNCTAD 2005) and responds to local demands (Dunning and Lundan
2008:71). Market-seeking MNCs often integrate well into the host society and closely
interact with local subsidiaries, clients, consumers and local businesses to secure a
‘social license’ to operate (Blanton and Blanton 2009). Such interactions can alleviate
potential tensions and skepticism of local communities against foreign investors. These
interactions can also facilitate human rights export and the di↵usion of human rights
values (Spar 1998). FDI in market-seeking sectors can “provide more benefits to host
countries than any other form of incoming direct investment” (Cohen 2007:68).
E ciency-seeking FDI is based on the motivation to reduce production costs. MNCs
10
often transfer some of their investment from industrialised countries to areas where
factor endowments such as labour are relatively lower (Dunning and Lundan 2008:72).
Labour-intensive production includes, for example, footwear and apparel, or the
assembly of standardised goods such as radios. Some export processing zones (EPZs)
with an emphasis on low labour costs and lax abour regulations fit into this category
(Blanton and Blanton 2009; ILO 2008; Amengual and Milberg 2008). Much
e ciency-seeking FDI can be found in Japanese MNCs in Asia, U.S. MNCs in Mexico,
Asia and Central America, and European MNCs in Central and Western Europe (Cohen
2007:69). When wages rise, FDI typically moves to other countries with even lower
wages (UNCTAD 2005) such as ‘latecomers’ Cambodia and Vietnam (UNCTAD
2010:41). When MNCs invest abroad because of an ample and cheap labour supply, host
countries might benefit from job creation and salaries above local levels in the short
term, but they cannot necessarily expect modernisation and economic development
e↵ects, or di↵usion of human rights values, to the wider economy (Cohen 2007:69-70).
In addition, when focusing on low-cost labour and exploitation of an abundant labour
force, then local unrest may occur, which can in turn trigger government violation of
human rights to maintain a stable business environment. It should be noted that some
e ciency-seeking FDI is not oriented towards low wages, but it can also be motivated by
economies of scale and high labour productivity such as in automobiles, electronics and
personal computers (UNCTAD 2005) or information technology or pharmaceuticals
(Cohen 2007:80). The e↵ects of e ciency-seeking FDI using a higher skilled workforce
may therefore not be as negative as in the above cases.
Application to Sectoral FDI
Table 1 shows for each industry sector included in this study how skills, technology
levels, and FDI motivation are classified in the literature, and how that can a↵ect rights
11
protection. In each industry, di↵erent features are present; these features can sometimes
reinforce each other (e.g. high-skilled work and market-seeking motivation), while at
other times they can be conflicting, so that an overall expected net e↵ect is not always
straightforward (e.g. low-skilled work and market-seeking features).
An example where reinforcing characteristics exist is investment in petrol and mining
industries. The motivation for investment is resource-seeking and exploitative, and skills
and technology levels are low. Therefore, the characteristics underlying the
FDI-repression link can reinforce each other, leading to tensions and overall negative
e↵ects on host country rights protection. In a positive reinforcing case, such as FDI in
depository institutions, or the manufacture of chemical products, we find a
market-seeking motivation, high skilled and technology levels, which can foster economic
development and the export of human rights.
However, there are cases where industry sectors have conflicting features, so that the
expected outcome on human rights is not immediately apparent. First, a sector can be
characterised as market-seeking but use low- or medium-skills and technology, e.g. the
manufacture of food and metals products, as well as wholesale trade FDI. The host
country integration typical for market-seeking sectors may still facilitate the di↵usion of
human rights values, but e↵ects on economic development via skills and technology
transfers cannot be guaranteed. Worse still, in low-paid jobs with an abundant labour
force, tensions may arise. In such cases, it would be necessary to weigh the strength of
human rights export mechanisms versus the potentially negative e↵ects of cheap,
unskilled labour. Since there is not a lot of evidence about the strength and nature of
human rights export in the literature (Letnes 2002), the expected impact is marked
‘indeterminate’ in the table.
The second conflicting case involves sectors where e ciency-seeking FDI meets
medium/high skills and technology. This set-up is the case for the manufacture of
machinery, electrical and transport equipment. In fact, the argument about an
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exploitative motivation of e ciency-seeking FDI rests upon the assumption that cheap,
low-skilled labour is employed. But in many cases, e ciency-seeking FDI can also be
motivated by economies of scale and higher labour productivity, which can require
higher skills, as seen in the sectors included in this analysis. Even though companies
may not interact with local businesses and the population as much as market-seeking
MNCs, e ciency-seeking FDI may still provide transfers of higher skills than the host
country (Cohen 2007; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004). In those cases, I expect an overall
positive e↵ect on rights protection.6
To sum up, the categorisation presented in Table 1 reflects the theoretical arguments of
the study and applies the framework to ten industry sectors. Each of these sectors
brings with it a set of characteristics and an expected rights impact. Under certain
circumstances, and in some industry sectors, firms might invest in repression by
supporting regimes that may answer unrest with political imprisonment or torture,
while the firms become complicit in human-rights abuses by states. In other industry
sectors, FDI could improve skills and knowledge transfer, enhance economic
development, and reduce the need of states to repress its citizens; FDI could even di↵use
human rights values. Disaggregating FDI into industry sectors is a first step towards a
more refined picture of e↵ects of FDI on repression and personal integrity rights.
The framework presented in Table 1 can be summarised as two main hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: FDI in resource-seeking sectors with low skills/technology levels is
connected to worse personal integrity rights protection.
• Hypothesis 2: FDI in market-seeking and e ciency-seeking sectors with high
skills/technology levels is connected to improved personal integrity rights
protection.
The empirical models in the next section correspond to this framework. I will employ
ten separate variables for di↵erent types of FDI in the sectoral models.
13
Table 1: Features of Sectoral FDI and the Expected Impact on Rights Protection
FDI Description Skills and
Technology
Motivation Impact
Extractive:
Petrol oil and gas extraction low resource -
Mining metal mining, non-metallic mining &
quarrying
low resource -
Manufacturing:
Food food and kindred products e.g. bever-
ages, preserved fruits
low market ind.
Chemical industrial chemicals and synthetics,
drugs, cleaners etc.
high market +
Metals primary metals; fabricated metals e.g.
metal cans, cutlery
low-medium market ind.
Machinery industrial machinery and equipment
e.g. construction machinery, computer
and o ce equipment, engines and tur-
bines, special industry machinery
high-
medium
e ciency +
Electrical electrical equipment, appliances e.g.
household appliances, electronic com-
ponents
medium-
high
e ciency +
Transport equipment such as motor vehicles,
aerospace and ship products
medium-
high
e ciency +
Service:
Wholesale Trade durable goods (e.g. motor vehicles,
electrical goods); non-durable goods
(e.g. apparel, groceries)
medium-low market ind.
Depository Institu-
tions
depository institutions such as banks
and savings institutions
high market +
FDI motivation drawn from Blanton and Blanton (2009:478). Skills levels and technology intensity are
drawn from OECD (2005:182) and OECD (2009:201). Mining and petrol industries are not commonly
classified according to technology levels and are market here as ‘low’ for low skills (OECD 2009). Service
sectors are not usually categorised in terms of technology intensity, but as (non-)knowledge intensive
(OECD 2009:201); but knowledge highly related to skills/technology and therefore used in the same
column as technology. Wholesale trade is non-knowledge intensive (marked as ‘low’), and depository
institutions is knowledge intensive (marked as ‘high’).
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Data and Methods
Dependent Variables
For the dependent variables, I employ two commonly used indices (CIRI Physical
Integrity Rights, Political Terror Scale) and a new measurement of personal integrity
rights, the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores (Fariss 2014). The CIRI Physical
Integrity Rights index7 captures protection from torture, extrajudicial killings by
government o cials without due process of law, disappearance where state agents are
likely to be responsible, and political imprisonments. The index is a generally accepted
and widely used measurement of personal integrity rights and repression levels. It ranges
from 0 (no government respect for rights) to 8 (full respect). The scores are derived
from coding rights violations reported in the Amnesty International Annual Report and
the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. One concern
with this measure could be that codings from U.S. government sources might be biased
towards reporting more positively about partner countries in which U.S. MNCs invest
(Mosley and Uno 2007; Poe et al. 2001). To account for this potential bias, the CIRI
coding manual recommends recording violations according to (potentially ‘harsher’)
reports of Amnesty in case of disagreement, so that the overall score is unbiased.
The Political Terror Scale (PTS)8 measures the integrity of the person including the
protection from execution, torture, forced disappearance, unlawful imprisonment and
discrimination based on political and religious beliefs. The PTS captures similar
features as the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights variable and is also a frequently employed
measurement in the human rights literature (Walker and Poe 2002). To compose this
index, country reports by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department were
coded. Scales from both codings are available separately. For the main models, the
codings based on the Amnesty reports were used to prevent potential bias as mentioned
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Table 2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description Scores
Outcome:
CIRI Integrity torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearance, political im-
prisonment (”PHYSINT” variable from CIRI data set);
score of 8 represents full rights protection
0 to 8
PTS execution, torture, forced disappearance, unlawful impris-
onment, discrimination based on beliefs; original scale re-
versed so that score of 5 represents full rights protection
(”Amnesty” from PTS data set)
1 to 5
Latent Scores Latent protection scores based on previous measurements
(repression, torture, physical integrity rights); higher scores
represent better rights protection
continuous;
standard
normal
FDI:
Total FDI FDI stock per GDP (log) from U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and global FDI measures from UNCTAD data
base; negative and zero values of FDI stock/GDP were re-
coded to 1, then logged
continuous
Sectoral FDI FDI stock per GDP (log) for ten industries across resource,
manufacturing and service sectors; from U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis
continuous
Controls:
Trade sum of total trade divided by GDP (log) from World Bank
Indicators database
continuous
GDPpc economic development measured as GDP per capita (log)
from World Bank Indicators
continuous
Population total population (log) from World Bank Indicators continuous
Democracy measure of democracy level (”polity2” from Polity IV data
set); scores of -10 are most autocratic states; 10 are most
democratic states
-10 to +10
Conflict international or domestic conflict in a country-year; score
of 0 represents no conflict in a country-year; 1 = conflict;
from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
binary
Employment in
Services and Indus-
try
share of the labor force employed in the industrial sector
and in services as percentage of total employment (log);
World Bank Indicators
continuous
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above, and in the robustness section I employ alternative versions of the PTS scale. The
PTS Amnesty index will be reversed here to match with the CIRI scale; this means that
in this study the PTS scores range from 1 (terror has expanded to the whole
population) to 5 (rights are well protected).
The Latent Human Rights Protection Scores by Fariss (2014)9 measure political
repression and personal integrity rights. This is the newest available measurement and
this study will be one of the first in the human rights literature to employ this variable.
Fariss (2014) developed this measurement because he observed a fundamental problem
with standard human rights measurements: according to many existing indices, human
rights practices do not seem to improve over time, despite changes in human rights
norms and laws, better monitoring, and the spread of democratic values and systems.
Fariss believes that the lack of a strong upward trend in the available indices is in fact
due to stricter monitoring and interpretations of rights violations in e.g. Amnesty
International and the U.S. State Department reports. In such reports, Fariss suggests,
coders find more violations because there is much better monitoring and information
about state repression in many more countries than in the past. Coders therefore
classify more acts as rights abuse than they did years ago. To account for this problem,
the Latent Human Rights Protection Scores combine and adjust existing measurements
of repression, including the CIRI and PTS measurements, so that a comprehensive, less
biased estimate of repression is provided.
Independent Variables
The key independent variable of interest is FDI stock relative to GDP. FDI stock reflects
the long-term accumulation of foreign investment over time, and with that, potential
long-term impact of such investment on the host country. Changes in government
policies and human rights outcomes are likely to build up over time, rather than
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changing swiftly with often volatile FDI flows each year, as recent studies have
emphasised (Neumayer and de Soysa 2006; Mosley and Uno 2007; Sorens and Ruger
2012). A shortcoming of some earlier work (e.g. Hafner-Burton 2005; Mitchell and
McCormick 1988) is the use of FDI flow data, assuming that recent inflows of FDI have
an immediate e↵ect on human rights protection. Criticising this practice, Nunnenkamp
and Spatz (2004) point out that growth enhancing spillover e↵ects of FDI most probably
emerge from long-term accumulated investment. Similarly, pathways though human
rights export are unlikely to be immediate, which is why FDI stock data are the
preferred measure.10 The main data for FDI stock used in this study stem from the
United States.11 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides data on U.S.
outbound FDI stock into the developing world. This is the only source for FDI data
disaggregated into sectors that covers a large time series and many countries (Blanton
and Blanton 2015). Even though it would be ideal to examine e↵ects of global sectoral
FDI in developing nations, neither the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank or the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) provide such data.12 While data scarcity poses
a limitation, the United States accounts, by far, for the largest FDI outward stock of
any single country in the world. In recent years, the outward stock of FDI from the U.S.
was higher than that of the two runner-ups combined (UNCTAD 2010; 2014).13 Using
FDI only from one country also has the advantage that it holds the ‘country of origin’
factor constant. This is important because the impact of MNCs and their investment
arguably depends on the corporate culture and other factors in their home country
(Tuman 2006; Tuman and Montero 2009).14 I compiled data for FDI divided into the
following sectors: extractive (petroleum, mining), manufacturing (food, fabricated
metals, chemical, electrical, industrial machinery, transportation equipment), services
(depository institutions and wholesale trade).
In addition to sectoral data, I also use total FDI from the U.S. and, as an alternative,
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global FDI from UNCTAD. I employ these total FDI measures because this is the most
common way in the literature to include investment data. FDI from the U.S. may show
slightly di↵erent e↵ects on human rights than global FDI from UNCTAD, because the
latter contains investment from a variety of Western and non-Western countries.
Following other studies in the field (Neumayer and de Soysa 2006; Sorens and Ruger
2012; Mosley and Uno 2007), all FDI stock is divided by GDP. This accounts for the size
of the host country economy and models the relative importance of each investment
sector in a country. This makes it possible to capture a country’s reliance on foreign
capital, and to account for the potential power of foreign investors over domestic
markets and government policies. The variable was logged to account for skewness.15
As control variables, I include trade openness, level of democracy, economic
development, conflict and population size, which are traditional determinants of state
repression and personal integrity rights (Landman 2006; Davenport 2007; Davenport
and Armstrong 2004; Hill and Jones 2014:103). The main goal here is not to include all
possible explanations of repression that have been proposed in the literature 16. Rather,
I will focus on e↵ects of ten di↵erent types of FDI, while controlling for potential
confounding variables that have been shown to be correlated to both rights and FDI
(Achen 2005; Ray 2005). While there is a potentially unlimited list of variables that
could influence repression, including them in addition to ten industry sectors and
various controls may reduce e ciency of the estimators (Sieberer 2007) and introduces
other problems for causal inference (Achen 2005). Young (2009) and Hill and Jones
(2014), who also examine repression, make a similar decision.
Trade is measured by the sum of a country’s total trade (import-export) as a percentage
of GDP. Trade openness is, together with FDI, often used as a proxy for economic
globalisation (Apodaca 2001; Sorens and Ruger 2012). It captures e↵ects on rights
protection through reduction of tari↵s and non-tari↵ trade barriers. The trade variable
is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database and logged to
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account for skewness.
The democracy level indicates if a country has established democratic institutions, the
rule of law and a good governance structure. It has been shown that democratic
countries protect rights better (e.g. Apodaca 2001; Richards et al. 2001). The
democracy variable was taken from the Polity IV measure of democracy, and it ranges
from -10 (most autocratic regime) to 10 (most democratic).
Economic development is measured by GDP per capita. The wealth of a country,
represented by this variable, has been shown to have significant e↵ects on rights
protection, indicating that wealthier countries are more likely to protect rights than
poor countries (e.g. Sorens and Ruger 2012). The economic development variable is
taken from the World Bank and logged.
Conflict measures if a country was involved in a domestic or international conflict in a
given year. Conflict has been shown to be connected to more human rights abuses (e.g.
Apodaca 2001; Richards et al. 2001). The conflict variable is a binary variable (1
indicates occurrence of domestic or international conflict; 0 indicates no conflict). The
variable stems from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.
Population size is the number of people living in a country. A large population size
could cause repressive tendencies in governments due to resource scarcity. Also, rights
measurements are often based on counting violations; in larger populations more
violations might occur (Richards et al. 2001; Sorens and Ruger 2012). The population
variable is taken from the World Bank and logged.
For the sectoral FDI models, I add the variables Employment in Services and
Employment in Industry, which are the share of the labor force employed in the
industrial sector and in services (as percentage of total employment). These control for
the size of these sectors in a host country.17 The data for sectoral employment are taken
from the World Bank.
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Models
For the ordered categorical outcome variables, CIRI and PTS, I estimate an ordered logit
model with robust standard errors clustered on country to correct for heteroscedasticity.
For the continuous outcome variable, the Latent Human Rights Scores by Fariss, I
employ OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).18 In both models I include a
lagged dependent variable (“Past”) since countries that repressed their citizens in the
past are more likely to use repressive acts in the future (Gurr 1988). A lagged
dependent variable also corrects the serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995; 2009).
I include a one-year lag between the outcome and predictors to allow the e↵ect of FDI
stock to spread in the country. This means that the accumulated FDI in a country in a
given year is expected to correlate with rights protection in the following year, which
establishes a time order and suggests a direction of causality from FDI(t 1) to rights
protection(t). The data set ranges from 1983 to 2010 and includes up to 121 non-OECD
countries. The selection of these cases is limited to countries with available data on
personal integrity rights and FDI measures (see a list of all countries in the online
appendix). Two main sets of models are estimated: the first set of models includes total
FDI to compare my results with previous work, while the second set of models replaces
total FDI with investment in ten industry sectors.
Results
Total FDI
In order to follow previous work on the topic, I entered total U.S. and global FDI in the
models, before I move on to the sectoral disaggregation. U.S. FDI stock per GDP is not
significantly associated with any of the three personal integrity rights measures
(Table 3). This is a similar result to previous studies, which often found no significant
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connections between FDI and rights. U.S. total FDI was then replaced by global total
FDI stock per GDP from UNCTAD. Global FDI is negatively connected to rights
protection measured by the CIRI index and the PTS scale, but insignificant for the
Latent Human Rights Scores. It is not entirely unexpected that FDI from the U.S. may
show di↵erent e↵ects than global FDI from UNCTAD, because the latter contains
investment from a range of Western and non-Western countries. Maybe FDI from
non-Western countries (reflected in the global FDI data) drives an overall negative e↵ect
on rights in developing nations, while FDI from the West (specifically from the U.S.) has
a null e↵ect – and hides the various sectoral components that matter more for human
rights than the sum total of FDI.19 The ambivalent results for total FDI with
insignificant or negative coe cients reflect the mixed results in the literature. A sectoral
disaggregation, which follows next, may prove more insightful.
The control variables behave mostly as expected. Trade, GDP per capita and
democracy20 are positively connected to personal integrity rights protection, while
population size and conflict21 are negatively associated with rights protection. The past
has a strong influence on the current protection of rights.
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Table 3: Total FDI and Personal Integrity Rights Protection (1983-2010)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI p. GDP  0.033⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤  0.001
(0.017) (0.018) (0.001)
US FDI p. GDP  0.022  0.029 0.002
(0.024) (0.028) (0.002)
Trade 0.091 0.243⇤⇤  0.001 0.133 0.316⇤⇤  0.001
(0.092) (0.116) (0.007) (0.121) (0.155) (0.008)
GDP p. capita 0.102⇤⇤ 0.104⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.114⇤⇤ 0.099 0.004
(0.045) (0.054) (0.004) (0.049) (0.064) (0.004)
Population  0.335⇤⇤⇤  0.225⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤⇤  0.337⇤⇤⇤  0.242⇤⇤⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.039) (0.004) (0.042) (0.046) (0.004)
Democracy 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001)
Conflict  0.688⇤⇤⇤  0.932⇤⇤⇤ 0.001  0.844⇤⇤⇤  0.912⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.128) (0.151) (0.011) (0.158) (0.192) (0.013)
Past 0.990⇤⇤⇤ 1.854⇤⇤⇤ 0.969⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤ 1.800⇤⇤⇤ 0.972⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.094) (0.010) (0.055) (0.110) (0.011)
Observations 2,799 2,523 2,934 1,879 1,697 1,925
R2 0.681 0.617 0.972 0.690 0.623 0.974
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.970
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged. Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
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Sectoral FDI
In the next step, total FDI was replaced by disaggregate U.S. FDI. Now, I employ
variables for the manufacture of (1) food, (2) chemical, (3) metals, (4) machinery, (5)
electrical and (6) transport goods; as well as investment in the service sectors (7)
wholesale trade and (8) depository institutions in the models. The resource sectors
petrol and mining FDI will be examined separately in subsets of the data due to missing
values (see robustness section). In Table 4, I present a baseline model in the first three
columns, and a model including controls for the size of the service and industry sector in
column four to six.22 All results are presented for the three measures of rights protection,
the CIRI physical integrity index, the Political Terror Scale, and the Latent scores.
The findings illustrate that investment is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon.
Investment in food, chemical, metal and wholesale trade sectors has negative
coe cients, indicating an overall negative e↵ect on human rights protection in the host
country. Transport, electrical and depository FDI have positive coe cients and are
connected to better rights protection. The coe cient for the manufacture of machinery
FDI remains insignificant. Overall, the coe cients are rather small, which has been
observed in previous work as well (Sorens and Ruger 2012). This could be due to the
fact that FDI is divided by GDP to account for the market size of a host country, or
because now several di↵erent types of FDI ‘share’ the e↵ects of overall FDI. The
coe cients with di↵erent signs for di↵erent industry sectors in Table 4 support the
argument that FDI e↵ects are sector-specific, and that previous studies may have come
to mixed results because they employed aggregate FDI measures.
A surprising result was investment in the manufacture of chemical products, such as
chemicals and synthetics, drugs or cleaners. This is a market-seeking sector with high
skills and technology levels, leading us to expect a positive impact due to both features.
Instead, the coe cient is negative. An explanation for a missing positive link could lie
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in host country characteristics. For example, positive skills and technology transfers to
host countries may only take place under favourable domestic conditions, such as an
adequate development of institutions, or a reasonably small gap in skills between the
investor and host country (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004). I follow this argument in the
robustness section. Indeed, when adding country dummies to the model, which account
for such country-specific factors, the negative e↵ect of chemical FDI vanishes. Future
research in the form of case study research will have to establish which particular
unfavourable country characteristics may be influential here, and how this may apply to
the chemical manufacturing industry in particular.
The controls for ’employment in services‘ and ’employment in industry‘ remain mostly
insignificant. In one case, the employment in industry sectors is negatively connected to
rights outcomes (Latent scores), indicating that high employment in industrial sectors
overall in a country may have negative e↵ects. An explanation could be that more
modernised, advanced countries with a large formal sector, for which employment in
industry could be a proxy, may also have better monitoring mechanisms to report rights
violations (Neumayer and de Soysa 2006). A limitation of the models including sector
size is that the sample size is much smaller than in the models without these additional
controls, and I will discuss this further in the robustness section.
The results also give indications on why some sectors may have positive e↵ects on rights
protection, while others seem to hinder improvements. Are skills and technology levels,
or rather FDI motivation, better explanations? Are any of the features stronger than
others? Two points can be made here.
First, when medium-high skills and technology levels are combined with a
market-seeking, integrative approach to investment (electrical, transport and depository
FDI), the coe cients are positive, supporting hypothesis 2. Higher skills and technology
in these factors may lead to positive spillover e↵ects, growth, and economic development
in host countries, which can enhance rights protection. Reinforcing this e↵ect, MNCs in
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these sectors are also motivated by access to local markets, where a liates integrate
with society, build good relationships, and may export human rights values to the
country. Here, skills levels and motivation for FDI seemed to work in the same direction
and may enforce each other. We do not, however, know if one of the two characteristics,
skills or motivation, drive the overall positive e↵ect. More illuminating could be sectors
where features conflict and could work against each other, because the overall net e↵ect
might indicates which characteristic dominates.
Some sectors in the study had indeed features where skills and technology levels, and
motivation of FDI, did not work in the same direction. These are food, metals and
wholesale trade FDI. Looking at the exact composition of features here, these are sectors
with low or medium-low skills and technology, which would not lead to positive
backward linkages to the country’s economy, and might even cause tensions due to the
potential exploitation of cheap labour. But these sectors were also characterised by a
market-seeking, integrative business motivation, which could lead to positive outcomes
via human rights export. The coe cients for all three sectors are negative. Therefore,
the second point to be made here is that a market-seeking motivation alone may not be
able to produce positive e↵ects on rights outcomes; it only seems to have positive e↵ects
when skills and technology levels are high at the same time.
It should be noted that the human rights export argument has not yet been tested
comprehensively in the quantitative literature about FDI e↵ects on rights. The results
here may indicate that the export argument works only in theory; or if it works, it is not
very strong because it can not outweigh non-existent or negative e↵ects in low-skilled
and low-tech industries. The results in Table 4 therefore indicate that skills and
technology characteristics of industry sectors seem to be be a stronger driving force
behind sectoral FDI e↵ects in conflicting cases. While I did not test this directly, but
only through the overall coe cients of each sector, this is a plausible claim. Similar
findings exist in other fields. There is a comprehensive body of work in international
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business studies and development that emphasises and provides abundant evidence that
high skills and technology levels can foster spillover e↵ects, growth and economic
development (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Moran 2006).
In sum, these results support the argument that FDI e↵ects vary across industry sectors
and indicate that skills and technology levels may may be more influential than the
human rights export argument.
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Table 4: Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights Protection (1983-2010)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
Baseline Sector Size Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food FDI  0.030  0.004 0.004  0.128⇤⇤  0.058 0.001
(0.039) (0.043) (0.004) (0.060) (0.098) (0.007)
Chemical FDI  0.056⇤  0.054  0.003  0.089⇤  0.018 0.001
(0.030) (0.040) (0.004) (0.050) (0.114) (0.006)
Metal FDI  0.035  0.056  0.010⇤⇤⇤  0.034  0.155⇤⇤  0.005
(0.034) (0.034) (0.004) (0.038) (0.062) (0.004)
Machinery FDI 0.021  0.024 0.005  0.031  0.125  0.002
(0.037) (0.031) (0.004) (0.057) (0.080) (0.005)
Electrical FDI 0.020 0.053⇤ 0.006⇤⇤ 0.027 0.115⇤ 0.001
(0.029) (0.031) (0.003) (0.051) (0.062) (0.005)
Transport FDI 0.010  0.0001 0.003 0.031  0.032 0.006⇤
(0.028) (0.034) (0.003) (0.043) (0.053) (0.003)
Wholesale FDI  0.023  0.006  0.006⇤⇤ 0.011  0.008  0.004
(0.020) (0.027) (0.003) (0.035) (0.058) (0.004)
Depository FDI 0.055 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.090⇤ 0.144⇤  0.001
(0.035) (0.027) (0.002) (0.050) (0.082) (0.004)
Trade 0.078 0.361⇤⇤ 0.010  0.150 0.289 0.019
(0.145) (0.183) (0.012) (0.220) (0.280) (0.023)
GDP p. capita 0.045 0.071 0.005 0.098  0.021 0.001
(0.089) (0.082) (0.007) (0.164) (0.176) (0.015)
Population  0.385⇤⇤⇤  0.211⇤⇤  0.008  0.613⇤⇤⇤  0.648⇤⇤⇤  0.019
(0.078) (0.095) (0.008) (0.181) (0.211) (0.019)
Democracy 0.049⇤⇤⇤ 0.027⇤⇤ 0.002⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.022  0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.016) (0.023) (0.002)
Conflict  0.868⇤⇤⇤  1.118⇤⇤⇤  0.016  1.698⇤⇤⇤  0.800⇤⇤  0.015
(0.214) (0.244) (0.013) (0.356) (0.400) (0.028)
Employm. Services  0.072 0.387 0.061
(0.423) (0.711) (0.044)
Employm. Industry  0.444  0.312  0.048⇤
(0.281) (0.442) (0.025)
Past 0.816⇤⇤⇤ 1.652⇤⇤⇤ 0.957⇤⇤⇤ 1.023⇤⇤⇤ 1.649⇤⇤⇤ 0.956⇤⇤⇤
(0.063) (0.160) (0.014) (0.114) (0.209) (0.020)
Observations 882 806 935 324 282 326
R2 0.637 0.611 0.967 0.764 0.683 0.978
Adjusted R2 0.952 0.927
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDP p. capita, population and trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
28
Robustness Checks
I conducted a range of robustness checks that (1) examine resource FDI in subsets of the
data, and address (2) the choice of U.S. sectoral FDI data, (3) the human rights
measurements, (4) time e↵ects, (5) regional and country e↵ects, and (6) missing data.
The results remained largely the same, with the models for aggregate FDI generally
being more robust to di↵erent specifications than the sectoral models. The online
appendix contains all results tables for the robustness checks.
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis provides separate data for petrol FDI only until
1998, and for mining FDI only from 1999.23 The respective other years contain missing
values. The attempt to include both mining and petrol FDI in the main models would
result in zero rows after listwise deletion. I therefore examine these two sectors on
subsets of the data according to the years in which they are available (Table A6).
Petrol FDI is negatively connected to rights, supporting hypothesis 1, but only when
measured by the Latent scores. The coe cient’s sign is also negative for the two other
rights measures, but insignificant. For mining FDI, the connection to rights protection is
either insignificant, or, surprisingly, weakly positive in one case (for the PTS scale).
This would mean that investment in metal and non-metallic mining may benefit rights
protection in the host country in some instances. Given that qualitative case studies
about mining companies paint a very negative picture, this would be a surprising result.
An explanation could be that the single-case literature has been selective, so that
mining investments were shown to have negative e↵ects in particular cases; but there is
no support for consistently negative e↵ects across countries and time. The result for
mining FDI could then be seen as evidence against the conventional wisdom that all
resource FDI has a negative impact, and contradicts hypothesis 1.
The second robustness check relates to the use of FDI data from the United States. This
study employed sectoral U.S. FDI because it is the largest investor world wide, and
29
global sectoral FDI data (stemming from all investors) in developing nations are not
available. UNCTAD used to provide such data for a fee; this service has now been
discontinued. The OECD provides sectoral FDI data, but only from OECD nations to
OECD nations, not to developing nations. To control for the economic influence of U.S.
FDI in terms of total present FDI in the host country market, I added a variable for the
share of U.S. FDI in overall FDI in a country-year, U.S. Dominance, to all total and
sectoral FDI models.24 U.S. Dominance is insignificant in all twelve models but one,
where the PTS scale is used (Table A7). The coe cient is very small (-0.006, significant
at the .05 level). In addition, a dummy was created to distinguish between cases where
U.S. FDI dominates overall FDI, and where it does not (1 for U.S. Dominance larger
than 50 percent). This dominance dummy is insignificant in all models (Table A8),
which suggests that on the whole concerns about using only U.S. FDI are justified,
though do not a↵ect in practical terms the baseline results in the main models.25
A further robustness check relates to the human rights measurements. In the main
models, the only scores selected were of the Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty
International reports to rule out potential bias in U.S. State Department reports, which
might favourably report on U.S. partner countries. While such bias may no longer be a
major concern in the contemporary context, for the historical data used here (from the
1980s), a bias may be present in the data. To examine if a bias exists, following (Young
2009), the Amnesty scores of the PTS were replaced by the State Department scores.
Alternatively, an additive variable created from the two PTS scales (AI + State Dep.
divided by 2)26 was also employed, which produced a 9-point scale. Using these two
alternatives as outcome variables did not substantively change the FDI e↵ects
(Table A9). Since the PTS Amnesty variable contains more observation points than the
two alternatives, it remained in the main model to preserve a larger sample size.
The next robustness check relates to time e↵ects. A common issue in panel-data analysis
is that there might be variation in measures over time that is not captured by existing
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covariates. A continuous time variable has been added as a control variable,27 with no
substantive changes in the coe cients for most of the variables (Tables A10 and A11).
An exception is that once temporal variation is accounted for, global FDI turns out to
be insignificant for models employing the CIRI outcome measure. This coe cient was
previously negative. It seems that the relationship was largely driven by the failure of
the CIRI outcome variable to account for changes in monitoring practices over time. The
sectoral FDI variables remain mostly the same in terms of significance and direction.
A further check regarding time relates to the one-year lag between explanatory factors
and human rights protection that has been employed, assuming that it takes (at least)
one year or so for e↵ects to show. Since I use FDI stock data, which have accumulated
over time and have (partially) been present in a country for years, a one-year lag has
been seen as reasonable (Hafner-Burton 2005; Sorens and Ruger 2012). As an
alternative, I added two, three, four and five year-lags between FDI and human rights
(Tables A12 and A13). Most results remain stable for the two-year lag28, but the
variables begin to loose significance levels with larger lags, which indicates that the
e↵ects may not be detectable anymore (also, longer lags mean fewer observations due to
the introduction of missing values in the time series). The model fit between a one and
two year lag does not substantively improve, so that the one-year lag remained in the
main model.
Human rights protection and repression di↵er across region and countries in the world,
indicating that neighbouring influences and country-related factors such as culture or
history might be at work as well. To account for the potential impact of such
unobserved time-invariant variables, I employ a simple OLS model with region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific; Latin America and Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa;
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; with the reference category Europe and Central
Asia). When reanalysing the total and sectoral FDI models with the regional controls,
most results remained substantively similar to the previous findings (Table A14
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and A15). Chemical FDI lost significance, which could indicate that the negative
coe cient from the main results was influenced by regional factors.
In addition, country dummies were included in a separate model to account for
country-specific factors (Tables A16 and A17). Again, most FDI coe cients remain
similar, with chemical FDI loosing significance. An exception is that machinery FDI is
now significant and positive. This sector has a high-medium skills and technology, and
e ciency-seeking set-up like electrical and transport FDI, and the results are in line
with the earlier results with these sectors.29
Finally, missing data is an important and common problem in human rights research
involving developing nations. The sample size of the main sectoral models ranges
between 806 (PTS) and 935 (Latent Scores), and when sector size is included, it is
reduced to max. 326 after listwise deletion.30 An examination of percentages of missing
data points shows that many observations for the sectoral FDI variables are not
available (Table A22). I therefore explored if one can predict the missingness of the
sectoral FDI data from existing variables in the data set. For each FDI sector, I created
a corresponding dummy (0 = FDI observation is available, 1 = observation missing),
which was used as an outcome variable in logistic regressions, where the predictors are
the control variables from the main analysis (GDP per capita, democracy etc.). Indeed
the control variables can predict missingness, which supports the common argument
that often poorer, authoritarian, conflict-ridden countries are more likely to have
missing data (Table A23). The main findings are likely not biased by this non-random
missingness since I do not only control for these variables in the main regressions, but I
also have enough variation in each variable (Table A5). There is still a good range of
country-years in the sample ranging from poor to rich, autocratic to democratic, at
peace vs. at war, small vs. large countries, so that the analysis provides a good insight
into the role of sectoral FDI for personal integrity rights protection.
Still, larger sample sizes are always better, and I explored several options to increase the
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sample size. First, I entered each sector into its own equation instead of all sectoral FDI
at once. Most of the results did not substantially change (Tables A24, A25, A26).31
While some of the sector coe cients dropped or gained significance, most of them kept
the same sign. Among those sectors which are significant, none produced surprises, so
that the finding that higher skilled sectors have positive e↵ects while those with lower
skills and technology have negative e↵ects, holds. When including sector size controls,
many results still stayed the same. However, for the models including the variables
Employment in Services and Employment in Industry have even smaller sample sizes, so
the results from entering each sector separately are of particular interest. Among the 24
models, which mostly confirmed my findings, three of the sectors (machinery, electrical,
depository FDI) had significant coe cients with directions that were not in line with the
expectations and the main results (Tables A27, A28, A29). I suspect that omitted
variable bias may be at work here. The sectoral FDI variables are correlated with each
other (and the outcome variable), as the correlation matrix (Table A2) shows. FDI in
one sector is likely to be a key omitted variable in a regression of FDI in another sector.
For the models without sector size controls this does not seem to matter much since the
results are similar, but for those where sector size is included the changes in some of the
coe cients indicate that these models should be treated cautiously.
Another way to increase the sample size is to include all countries, and not just
developing nations, in the analysis. When I re-ran the models, the main results were
similar (see table A32). Again, some variables lost or gained significance, but the main
results generally hold.32
Conclusions
This article addressed the question: How does foreign direct investment a↵ect levels of
repression and personal integrity rights? The main purpose was to introduce a sectoral
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view of FDI to the human rights literature, since virtually all studies on e↵ects of FDI
on rights protection used lump-sum FDI measures and yielded conflicting results. The
conventional mixed-bag e↵ect was confirmed here: when employing total FDI as a first
step, e↵ects on rights protection were inconclusive (negative or insignificant). Total FDI
data was then replaced by sectoral FDI. This result supported the main argument that
sectors matter. Depending on the industry, FDI was connected to rights in di↵erent
ways. Generally, FDI was positively connected to rights outcomes when medium- and
high-skilled workers and technology were present. Sectors with low skills and technology
levels had negative e↵ects. This held even when sectors were characterised by
investment motivations that are not necessarily beneficial for rights protection. In
several instances, skills and technology levels seemed to be the driving force behind FDI
e↵ects and trumped potential influences via the motivation link. The strong influence of
skills and technology levels on fostering economic development reflects findings in the
literature on spillover e↵ects and growth in international business studies and
development (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Moran 2006). The results were robust
across several measures for repression and rights protection, as well as when accounting
for sector size, region and country influences, and time e↵ects.
The results of this study have pointed to many opportunities to follow up with
qualitative and quantitative human rights research from a sectoral perspective. First,
further case-study work needs to examine the pathways discussed here in more detail,
and in specific country contexts. Secondly, FDI increasingly comes from non-Western
countries, and many previously developing nations now invest in neighbouring countries.
It would be interesting to conduct statistical analyses on sectoral FDI stemming from
non-traditional investors such as China.
To sum up, the sectoral models employed here showed that an industry breakdown gives
more insight into the relationship between FDI and rights than in previous work, and
illustrated the importance of exploring industry-specific links to extend the findings
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presented here. In doing so, this article answered long existing calls in the human rights
literature requesting such an analysis (Kim and Trumbore 2010; Apodaca 2002; Sorens
and Ruger 2012). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on e↵ects of FDI
on repression that integrates sector-specific factors into a theoretical framework and
tests this in a cross-country time-series analysis. The study therefore adds important
insights to the literature on determinants of repression and aims to inspire new
discussions regarding the previously “unstable” (Davenport 2007:14) findings about FDI
e↵ects on host countries.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental materials, including tables for the robustness checks, can be accessed in
the online appendix on the publisher’s website.
Notes
1The replication data used in the study can be obtained at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jhr.
2There are no cross-country measures for direct human rights violations conducted by multinational
corporations (MNCs) in host countries. Rather, the existing indices are suitable for assessing the levels
of government repression and rights violations by state actors.
3See reports on the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website, e.g. http://business-
humanrights.org/en/oil-pollution/human-rights-impacts-of-oil-pollution-nigeria (accessed June 9, 2016).
4Exceptions are Smith et al. (1999) and Timberlake and Williams (1984).
5One could also make the opposite case and argue that expropriation of MNCs, and subsequent MNC
withdrawal, might result in hindering human rights (Johnston et al. 2016).
6There are no e ciency-seeking and low-skilled FDI industries included in this study due to data
availability. I can therefore not fully test the skills variation argument within e ciency-seeking FDI.
7Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 2008. The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset
Version 2008.03.12. http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html.
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8Political Terror Scale 1976-2010. Retrieved October 25, 2011, from the Political Terror Scale Web
site: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/.
9Latent Human Rights Protection Scores (Version 2), provided by Christopher Fariss by email. Up-
dates of this measurement are available from http://humanrightsscores.org/. See Fariss (2014), and
further also Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014).
10As Blanton and Blanton (2015) have also noted, data for sectoral FDI invested in developing nations
in the form of flow data are not available from e.g. the World Bank, U.S. BEA, UNCTAD or OECD.
Therefore, a robustness check using data for sectoral FDI flow is not possible.
11Direct investment abroad is defined by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as “[o]wnership
or control, directly or indirectly, by one U.S. person, or entity, of 10 percent or more of the voting
securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated
foreign business enterprise.” See http://www.bea.gov/glossary/ (accessed June 9, 2016).
12UNCTAD used to provide similar data for a fee; this service is now discontinued. The OECD provides
data for sectoral outward FDI but only for OECD host countries - and not developing nations, which are
the focus of this study.
13While some studies (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Meyer 1996) have argued that U.S. FDI in a host
country can serve as proxy for its total inward FDI position, I hesitate to make this claim.
14Adolph et al. (2016) demonstrate that a country’s labour culture and labour regulation can influence
other states via trade relations. In particular, Africas exports to China can influence labor practices and
worker rights in Africa.
15Some observations for U.S. FDI stock were negative. The reason is that the investment position
abroad is measured as the net financial claims that U.S. companies have on their foreign a liates. A
negative position means that U.S. companies are in a net liability position toward their foreign a liates,
which can occur e.g. if the U.S. parent companies received loans from their foreign a liates (email
correspondence with BEA Feb 13, 2012). In this paper, similar to Blanton and Blanton (2009), all
negative or zero values of FDI/GDP were recoded to 1 before logging, which then logs to zero.
16For example, judicial independence (Abouharb et al. 2013) or treaty membership (Brysk and Jimenez
2012; Sandholtz 2012).
17Data for a greater disaggregation into sector size of each particular industry sector examined here is
not available.
18For the ordered logit models, I use the functions lrm() and robcov() from the R package “rms” version
4.3-0, which produces the same results as the corresponding STATA command ologit with the cluster()
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modification (STATA version 13.0). For OLS with PCSE, I use the functions plm() and vcovBK() from
the R package “plm” version 1.3.1, which produces the same results as the STATA command xtpcse with
the pairwise specification.
19A second, alternative explanation of the negative coe cients for total global FDI refers to the three
outcome measures. Only the coe cients for CIRI and PTS are negative and significant, while the Latent
Scores remain insignificant. Only the Latent Scores correct for more monitoring of violations in recent
years. In fact, the robustness section will show that for the CIRI outcome variable, the negative e↵ect of
FDI vanishes once temporal variation is accounted for.
20In the main models, I use the “polity2” scale, which includes values of -10 (most autocratic) to 10
(most democratic). Davenport and Armstrong (2004) have argued that e↵ects of democracy may only
take place after certain threshold. Following Davenport and Armstrong (2004) and Young (2009), I use
binary composition which inserts dummy variables for each of the democracy level into the models. I
find, consistent with the authors, that there may be a threshold e↵ect above a democracy level of 8 in
some cases. The coe cients, signs and goodness of fit are not a↵ected by this (Tables A20 and A21 in
the appendix).
21The repression literature has suggested that civil war is much more prevalent and crucial than in-
ternational war in its impact on rights protection. When replacing my conflict measure, which combines
both domestic and international war following Apodaca (2001), with separate variables for major and
minor civil wars, the results are not a↵ected (Tables A18 and A19 in the appendix).
22Since global sectoral data located in non-OECD nations are are not available from UNCTAD, OECD
or the World Bank, models employ only U.S. FDI in this section.
23The BEA classified FDI data up until 1998 according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC); FDI
data starting from 1999 were classified according to the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). Most sectors employed here remain practically the same and can be examined for the full
timeline. However, petrol and mining FDI are available only for the two separate time periods (petrol
is only available until 1998; mining is only available from 1999). The BEA notes: “For earlier years,
petroleum is shown as a separate major industry group because petroleum-related activities accounted
for a major portion of all direct investment activity; however, their relative importance has declined
significantly in recent years, reducing the need for a separate group.” See http://www.bea.gov/scb/
account_articles/international/0899iid/box2.htm (accessed 12 April 2016).
24U.S. FDI total divided by UN FDI total multiplied by 100 (per country-year); lagged by one year as
all independent variables.
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25I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. Peter Nunnenkamp and Robert G. Blanton
provided helpful feedback on how to deal with this issue.
26I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
27This is preferred to adding time fixed e↵ects, which would over-specify the model in light of the small
sample size.
28Investment in food sectors turns, for the two year lag, to a positive sign, and then becomes insignif-
icant. Food is the least stable sector across the robustness checks. An explanation could be that it
depends on country characteristics not accounted for by the control variables; when adding country and
region dummies, food FDI becomes insignificant in all models.
29Power analysis for multiple regression indicates that models including country dummies are least
able to detect small e↵ects. For example, for the Latent Scores as an outcome, the model with country
dummies includes 118 predictors and has good power to detect a medium sized e↵ect, but it has little
power to detect small e↵ect sizes (Cohen’s f2 = 0.02), leaving an about 70 percent chance of a type II
error. Since the e↵ect sizes of the sectoral FDI data are rather small across all models employed here,
the country dummy model is least favourable.
30In terms of statistical power, the sample size in the main sectoral models (Table 4, models 1-3) is large
enough to detect small e↵ects. When sector size controls are included (Table 4, models 4-6), only medium
size e↵ects can be detected so that chances of missing smaller e↵ects are higher (see power calculations
in Tables A30 and A31).
31I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
32An exception is one model, where wholesale trade has a significant positive coe cient (which was
previously mostly negative), which could be explained by the fact that we now have quite di↵erent
country-year compositions in the sample, including OECD members and not just developing nations, as
in all the other models here.
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Online appendix to Foreign Direct Investment and
Repression: An Analysis Across Industry Sectors
This online appendix contains information about the variables and countries employed,
as well as tables for the robustness checks conducted for this study.
Variable and Sample Information
Table A1: List of Countries
Albania Djibouti Liberia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Dominican Republic Libya Senegal
Angola Ecuador Lithuania Sierra Leone
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Armenia El Salvador Madagascar Solomon Islands
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Malawi Somalia
Bahrain Eritrea Malaysia South Africa
Bangladesh Ethiopia Mali Sri Lanka
Belarus Fiji Mauritania Sudan
Benin Gabon Mauritius Swaziland
Bhutan Gambia, The Moldova Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Georgia Mongolia Tajikistan
Botswana Ghana Montenegro Tanzania
Brazil Guatemala Morocco Thailand
Bulgaria Guinea Mozambique Togo
Burkina Faso Guyana Namibia Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi Haiti Nepal Tunisia
Cambodia Honduras Nicaragua Turkmenistan
Cameroon India Niger Uganda
Central African Republic Indonesia Nigeria Ukraine
Chad Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman United Arab Emirates
China Jamaica Pakistan Uruguay
Colombia Jordan Panama Uzbekistan
Comoros Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Venezuela, RB
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kenya Paraguay Vietnam
Congo, Rep. Kuwait Peru Yemen, Rep.
Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic Philippines Zambia
Cote d’Ivoire Lao PDR Qatar Zimbabwe
Croatia Latvia Romania
Cuba Lebanon Russian Federation
Cyprus Lesotho Rwanda
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Table A5: Descriptive Variable Information
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
CIRI Phys. Integrity 3,507 4.428 2.243 0 8
PTS Amnesty 3,190 3.105 1.068 1 5
Latent Scores (Fariss) 4,129 0.173 1.291  3.180 4.178
Global FDI/GDP 3,888 18.280 4.111 0.000 25.867
U.S. Total FDI/GDP 2,393  3.902 2.317  12.731 3.781
Petrol FDI/GDP 934  3.971 2.731  13.155 0.000
Mining FDI/GDP 1,185  2.034 2.996  12.731 0.361
Food FDI/GDP 2,507  2.247 3.526  12.588 0.000
Chemical FDI/GDP 2,548  2.376 3.341  12.346 0.000
Metal FDI/GDP 2,596  1.741 3.404  12.785 0.000
Machinery FDI/GDP 2,702  1.471 3.269  12.911 0.000
Electrical FDI/GDP 2,744  1.320 3.037  12.713 0.000
Transport FDI/GDP 2,678  0.926 2.629  12.467 0.000
Whole. Trade FDI/GDP 2,427  3.366 3.476  12.057 0.345
Deposit. Inst. FDI/GDP 2,109  1.787 2.972  11.121 0.057
Trade 3,635 4.266 0.630  1.175 6.132
GDP p. capita 3,967 7.320 1.426 4.164 12.135
Population 4,413 15.054 2.253 9.022 21.009
Democracy 3,278  0.104 6.800  10 10
Conflict 4,424 0.177 0.381 0 1
All investment variables, as well as Trade, GDPpc and Population are logged.
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Figure A1: Time trends for three measures of repression. Left: Average scores for tradi-
tional measurements across non-OECD countries: CIRI personal integrity rights protec-
tion (0-8) and Political Terror Scale (1-5). Higher scores indicate better protection. The
scores are fairly stable with only some improvements in some years. Right: Average values
for Fariss’ measurement ‘Latent Human Rights Protection Scores’ with a clear upward
trend.
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Robustness Checks
Table A6: Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights (incl. petrol and mining)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Petrol FDI  0.027  0.070  0.005⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.046) (0.002)
Mining FDI 0.029 0.094⇤ 0.002
(0.038) (0.049) (0.004)
Food FDI  0.002  0.008 0.011⇤  0.001 0.026  0.002
(0.064) (0.062) (0.006) (0.049) (0.098) (0.005)
Chemical FDI  0.105⇤⇤  0.076⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤  0.014  0.055 0.007
(0.052) (0.045) (0.005) (0.067) (0.111) (0.007)
Metal FDI 0.047  0.184⇤⇤⇤  0.011  0.086  0.068  0.006
(0.052) (0.056) (0.008) (0.054) (0.061) (0.005)
Machinery FDI 0.007 0.030 0.008 0.023  0.007 0.0004
(0.049) (0.039) (0.005) (0.081) (0.078) (0.007)
Electrical FDI  0.010  0.019 0.009⇤⇤ 0.092⇤ 0.075 0.002
(0.044) (0.037) (0.004) (0.051) (0.070) (0.006)
Transport FDI 0.009 0.052 0.007 0.010  0.042 0.001
(0.074) (0.039) (0.006) (0.029) (0.041) (0.004)
Wholesale FDI  0.077 0.204⇤⇤⇤  0.004  0.016  0.046  0.004
(0.051) (0.079) (0.008) (0.027) (0.044) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.077⇤⇤ 0.152⇤⇤⇤ 0.004  0.093 0.094 0.001
(0.037) (0.045) (0.003) (0.068) (0.081) (0.006)
Trade 0.184 0.616⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤ 0.084 0.219  0.018
(0.250) (0.274) (0.018) (0.244) (0.287) (0.019)
GDP p. capita  0.012 0.167  0.004 0.069 0.183 0.003
(0.132) (0.162) (0.015) (0.110) (0.128) (0.009)
Population  0.393⇤⇤  0.068 0.008  0.511⇤⇤⇤  0.284⇤⇤  0.026⇤
(0.156) (0.150) (0.012) (0.131) (0.144) (0.015)
Democracy 0.051⇤⇤ 0.045⇤ 0.003 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.030 0.001
(0.024) (0.023) (0.002) (0.016) (0.020) (0.001)
Conflict  1.357⇤⇤⇤  1.141⇤⇤⇤  0.049⇤⇤  0.935⇤⇤  1.260⇤⇤⇤  0.001
(0.358) (0.339) (0.022) (0.446) (0.345) (0.029)
Past 0.610⇤⇤⇤ 1.380⇤⇤⇤ 0.941⇤⇤⇤ 1.106⇤⇤⇤ 1.550⇤⇤⇤ 0.956⇤⇤⇤
(0.090) (0.215) (0.025) (0.122) (0.252) (0.024)
Years 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 2000-2010 2000-2010 2000-2010
Observations 313 296 338 365 318 376
R2 0.591 0.629 0.962 0.733 0.595 0.968
Adjusted R2 0.916 0.927
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
CIRI and PTS: Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
Latent Scores: OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDP p. capita, population and trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
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Table A7: Total and Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, incl. U.S. Dominance
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US total FDI  0.020  0.019 0.001
(0.025) (0.030) (0.002)
Food FDI  0.082⇤⇤  0.065  0.003
(0.036) (0.040) (0.005)
Chemical FDI  0.049⇤  0.038  0.001
(0.029) (0.045) (0.004)
Metal FDI  0.014  0.053  0.008⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.036) (0.003)
Machinery FDI 0.007  0.043 0.002
(0.036) (0.036) (0.004)
Electrical FDI 0.008 0.044 0.006⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.033) (0.003)
Transport FDI 0.025  0.008 0.004
(0.030) (0.036) (0.003)
Whole. Trade FDI  0.026  0.004  0.005⇤
(0.022) (0.032) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.063⇤ 0.132⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.031) (0.003)
Trade 0.119 0.275⇤  0.003  0.014 0.309⇤ 0.002
(0.119) (0.158) (0.007) (0.152) (0.185) (0.011)
GDP p. capita 0.115⇤⇤ 0.101 0.004 0.023 0.043  0.006
(0.049) (0.065) (0.004) (0.094) (0.096) (0.008)
Population  0.337⇤⇤⇤  0.253⇤⇤⇤  0.017⇤⇤⇤  0.411⇤⇤⇤  0.333⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤
(0.042) (0.048) (0.004) (0.098) (0.109) (0.008)
Democracy 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.014) (0.015) (0.001)
Conflict  0.846⇤⇤⇤  0.898⇤⇤⇤ 0.002  1.101⇤⇤⇤  1.074⇤⇤⇤  0.022
(0.157) (0.195) (0.013) (0.251) (0.260) (0.018)
US FDI Dominance  0.0004  0.002 0.00002  0.005  0.007⇤⇤  0.00002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0003)
Past 0.970⇤⇤⇤ 1.802⇤⇤⇤ 0.972⇤⇤⇤ 0.853⇤⇤⇤ 1.513⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.111) (0.011) (0.067) (0.163) (0.014)
Observations 1,851 1,678 1,897 707 634 741
R2 0.692 0.623 0.975 0.671 0.620 0.969
Adjusted R2 0.970 0.948
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
U.S. Dominance is the share of US FDI in Global FDI.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDP p. capita, population and trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV). Years included: 1983-2010.
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Table A8: Total and Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, incl. U.S. Dominance
Dummy
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US total FDI  0.019  0.026 0.002
(0.024) (0.029) (0.002)
Food FDI  0.081⇤⇤  0.064⇤  0.003
(0.035) (0.039) (0.005)
Chemical FDI  0.051⇤  0.040  0.001
(0.030) (0.046) (0.004)
Metal FDI  0.009  0.042  0.008⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.035) (0.003)
Machinery FDI 0.006  0.045 0.002
(0.036) (0.036) (0.004)
Electrical FDI 0.010 0.050 0.006⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.035) (0.002)
Transport FDI 0.025  0.009 0.004
(0.030) (0.035) (0.003)
Whole. Trade FDI  0.025  0.003  0.005⇤
(0.022) (0.032) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.065⇤⇤ 0.133⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.030) (0.003)
Trade 0.115 0.290⇤  0.004 0.008 0.367⇤ 0.002
(0.117) (0.156) (0.007) (0.146) (0.190) (0.011)
GDP p. capita 0.115⇤⇤ 0.096 0.004 0.014 0.021  0.006
(0.049) (0.065) (0.004) (0.096) (0.097) (0.008)
Population  0.339⇤⇤⇤  0.253⇤⇤⇤  0.017⇤⇤⇤  0.401⇤⇤⇤  0.310⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤
(0.042) (0.049) (0.004) (0.094) (0.106) (0.008)
Democracy 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤ 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014) (0.001)
Conflict  0.842⇤⇤⇤  0.905⇤⇤⇤ 0.002  1.101⇤⇤⇤  1.090⇤⇤⇤  0.021
(0.157) (0.193) (0.013) (0.251) (0.260) (0.018)
US Dominance Dummy  0.092  0.100  0.003  0.299  0.149  0.005
(0.156) (0.209) (0.013) (0.254) (0.299) (0.025)
Past 0.970⇤⇤⇤ 1.802⇤⇤⇤ 0.972⇤⇤⇤ 0.855⇤⇤⇤ 1.506⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.111) (0.011) (0.066) (0.164) (0.014)
Observations 1,851 1,678 1,897 707 634 741
R2 0.692 0.622 0.975 0.671 0.618 0.969
Adjusted R2 0.970 0.948
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
U.S. Dominance Dummy is 1 when the share of US FDI in Global FDI ¿0.5.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDP p. capita, population and trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV). Years included: 1983-2010.
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Table A9: Using Alternative Versions of the Political Terror Scale
Dependent variable:
PTS Overall PTS State Dept
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI  0.029⇤  0.029⇤
(0.015) (0.015)
U.S. total FDI  0.017  0.017
(0.024) (0.024)
Food FDI  0.005  0.011
(0.046) (0.045)
Chemical FDI  0.043  0.025
(0.058) (0.046)
Metal FDI  0.078⇤  0.100⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.041)
Machinery FDI 0.009 0.024
(0.035) (0.038)
Electrical FDI 0.065⇤⇤ 0.037
(0.029) (0.047)
Transport FDI  0.019 0.026
(0.031) (0.036)
Whole. Trade FDI  0.019  0.022
(0.023) (0.025)
Depository FDI 0.090⇤⇤⇤ 0.095⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.036)
Trade 0.186⇤ 0.259⇤ 0.228 0.186⇤ 0.259⇤ 0.089
(0.109) (0.151) (0.149) (0.109) (0.151) (0.142)
GDP p. capita 0.125⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤ 0.093 0.125⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤ 0.165⇤
(0.047) (0.055) (0.087) (0.047) (0.055) (0.092)
Population  0.218⇤⇤⇤  0.229⇤⇤⇤  0.222⇤⇤  0.218⇤⇤⇤  0.229⇤⇤⇤  0.270⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.050) (0.096) (0.039) (0.050) (0.084)
Democracy 0.018⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤ 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤ 0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Conflict  0.607⇤⇤⇤  0.518⇤⇤⇤  0.796⇤⇤⇤  0.607⇤⇤⇤  0.518⇤⇤⇤  1.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.138) (0.168) (0.228) (0.138) (0.168) (0.252)
Past 2.871⇤⇤⇤ 2.921⇤⇤⇤ 2.608⇤⇤⇤ 2.871⇤⇤⇤ 2.921⇤⇤⇤ 2.180⇤⇤⇤
(0.113) (0.137) (0.202) (0.113) (0.137) (0.149)
Observations 2,504 1,686 798 2,504 1,686 925
R2 0.735 0.744 0.716 0.735 0.744 0.708
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDPpc, population, trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
PTS overall is calculated as PTS Amnesty + PTS State Dept., divided by 2.
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Table A10: Total FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, including time variable
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI p.GDP  0.015  0.032⇤  0.001
(0.017) (0.018) (0.001)
U.S. FDI p. GDP  0.034  0.031 0.002
(0.025) (0.028) (0.002)
Trade 0.172⇤⇤ 0.261⇤⇤  0.003 0.240⇤⇤ 0.331⇤⇤  0.004
(0.087) (0.119) (0.007) (0.108) (0.159) (0.008)
GDP p. capita 0.112⇤⇤ 0.106⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤⇤ 0.103 0.003
(0.046) (0.054) (0.004) (0.052) (0.065) (0.004)
Population  0.318⇤⇤⇤  0.219⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤  0.330⇤⇤⇤  0.240⇤⇤⇤  0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.041) (0.005) (0.041) (0.047) (0.005)
Democracy 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001)
Conflict  0.748⇤⇤⇤  0.941⇤⇤⇤ 0.0004  0.912⇤⇤⇤  0.919⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.133) (0.151) (0.011) (0.168) (0.194) (0.013)
Time  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.006 0.001  0.026⇤⇤⇤  0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001)
Past 0.973⇤⇤⇤ 1.851⇤⇤⇤ 0.967⇤⇤⇤ 0.945⇤⇤⇤ 1.798⇤⇤⇤ 0.970⇤⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.095) (0.010) (0.054) (0.111) (0.011)
Observations 2,799 2,523 2,934 1,879 1,697 1,925
R2 0.684 0.617 0.972 0.692 0.624 0.974
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.970
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Including a year continuous time variable to account for temporal variation in measures over time.
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged. Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
Years included: 1983-2010.
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Table A11: Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, including time variable
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel
linear
(1) (2) (3)
Food FDI  0.028  0.005 0.003
(0.039) (0.044) (0.004)
Chemical FDI  0.049⇤  0.060  0.005
(0.029) (0.042) (0.004)
Metal FDI  0.031  0.060⇤  0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.036) (0.003)
Machinery FDI 0.021  0.025 0.005
(0.037) (0.031) (0.004)
Electrical FDI 0.025 0.049 0.005⇤
(0.028) (0.031) (0.003)
Transport FDI 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.028) (0.034) (0.003)
Wholesale FDI  0.029  0.001  0.005⇤
(0.020) (0.029) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.064⇤ 0.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤
(0.037) (0.028) (0.002)
Trade 0.126 0.327⇤ 0.003
(0.144) (0.195) (0.012)
GDP p. capita 0.066 0.056 0.002
(0.091) (0.087) (0.007)
Population  0.367⇤⇤⇤  0.228⇤⇤  0.012
(0.079) (0.103) (0.008)
Democracy 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.001)
Conflict  0.899⇤⇤⇤  1.103⇤⇤⇤  0.017
(0.222) (0.242) (0.013)
Time  0.015 0.010 0.002⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.013) (0.001)
Past 0.811⇤⇤⇤ 1.656⇤⇤⇤ 0.953⇤⇤⇤
(0.064) (0.160) (0.015)
Years 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999
Observations 882 806 935
R2 0.638 0.612 0.967
Adjusted R2 0.951
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Robustness: Using a year continuous time variable
to account for temporal variation in measures over time.
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors.
OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
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Table A14: Total FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, incl. region dummies
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI p. GDP  0.035⇤⇤  0.020  0.00001
(0.016) (0.020) (0.001)
US FDI p. GDP  0.030  0.020 0.001
(0.026) (0.029) (0.002)
Trade  0.006 0.074  0.005 0.020 0.121  0.003
(0.108) (0.123) (0.007) (0.155) (0.171) (0.009)
GDP p. capita 0.112⇤⇤ 0.160⇤⇤ 0.003 0.103⇤ 0.155⇤ 0.0001
(0.049) (0.064) (0.004) (0.062) (0.080) (0.004)
Population  0.367⇤⇤⇤  0.282⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤  0.377⇤⇤⇤  0.317⇤⇤⇤  0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.045) (0.005) (0.048) (0.056) (0.005)
Democracy 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 0.001⇤ 0.045⇤⇤⇤ 0.009 0.002⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001)
Conflict  0.704⇤⇤⇤  1.000⇤⇤⇤ 0.005  0.834⇤⇤⇤  1.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.006
(0.129) (0.150) (0.011) (0.165) (0.195) (0.014)
Past 0.982⇤⇤⇤ 1.813⇤⇤⇤ 0.970⇤⇤⇤ 0.948⇤⇤⇤ 1.761⇤⇤⇤ 0.972⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.094) (0.010) (0.055) (0.109) (0.011)
East Asia and Pacific 0.331⇤⇤ 0.125  0.001 0.270 0.141 0.008
(0.139) (0.157) (0.012) (0.169) (0.181) (0.018)
Latin America and Caribbean  0.144  0.495⇤⇤⇤ 0.002  0.118  0.451⇤⇤  0.001
(0.156) (0.174) (0.014) (0.199) (0.209) (0.015)
Middle East and North Africa  0.006  0.757⇤⇤⇤  0.012  0.085  0.776⇤⇤⇤ 0.008
(0.188) (0.178) (0.012) (0.225) (0.220) (0.017)
South Asia  0.293  0.234  0.052⇤⇤⇤  0.571⇤⇤  0.176  0.032
(0.212) (0.349) (0.020) (0.228) (0.454) (0.020)
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.041  0.360⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤  0.144  0.369⇤  0.014
(0.130) (0.172) (0.013) (0.165) (0.206) (0.012)
Observations 2,799 2,523 2,934 1,879 1,697 1,925
R2 0.683 0.623 0.972 0.692 0.629 0.974
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.968
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged. Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
Region classification according to World Bank.
Europe and Central Asia is the reference category for region dummies and not displayed.
Appendix page 15
Table A15: Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights, incl. region dummies
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
Food FDI  0.031  0.010 0.003
(0.045) (0.050) (0.004)
Chemical FDI  0.050  0.042  0.003
(0.031) (0.042) (0.004)
Metal FDI  0.021  0.062  0.008⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.038) (0.003)
Machinery FDI 0.021  0.016 0.004
(0.035) (0.031) (0.004)
Electrical FDI 0.035 0.062⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.030) (0.003)
Transport FDI  0.002 0.016 0.002
(0.028) (0.030) (0.003)
Wholesale FDI  0.024  0.011  0.006⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.027) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.051 0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.030) (0.002)
Trade 0.036 0.245 0.014
(0.193) (0.217) (0.014)
GDP p. capita 0.079 0.146  0.001
(0.098) (0.095) (0.008)
Population  0.388⇤⇤⇤  0.219⇤⇤  0.008
(0.090) (0.098) (0.008)
Democracy 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.019 0.002
(0.012) (0.013) (0.001)
Conflict  0.842⇤⇤⇤  1.133⇤⇤⇤  0.009
(0.212) (0.253) (0.013)
Past 0.801⇤⇤⇤ 1.629⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.156) (0.015)
East Asia and Pacific 0.264  0.101 0.0003
(0.188) (0.247) (0.023)
Latin America and Caribbean 0.109  0.438 0.028
(0.264) (0.302) (0.023)
Middle East and North Africa  0.288  0.798⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.285) (0.256) (0.020)
South Asia  0.706⇤  0.263  0.033
(0.410) (0.543) (0.029)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.068  0.331  0.016
(0.194) (0.298) (0.019)
Observations 882 806 935
R2 0.642 0.616 0.967
Adjusted R2 0.947
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A16: Total FDI and Personal Integrity Rights Protection (OLS with country dum-
mies)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
panel panel panel panel panel panel
linear linear linear linear linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI p. GDP  0.038⇤⇤⇤  0.011  0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.002)
US FDI p. GDP  0.055⇤⇤  0.004 0.001
(0.023) (0.011) (0.003)
Trade 0.276⇤⇤⇤ 0.095⇤  0.007  0.203 0.049  0.039⇤
(0.092) (0.050) (0.013) (0.147) (0.081) (0.020)
GDP p. capita  0.034 0.033  0.009  0.243⇤⇤⇤  0.018  0.017⇤
(0.066) (0.030) (0.009) (0.080) (0.040) (0.009)
Population  0.768⇤⇤⇤  0.146 0.066⇤⇤⇤ 0.143 0.045 0.140⇤⇤⇤
(0.208) (0.104) (0.022) (0.309) (0.148) (0.040)
Democracy 0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 0.002⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001)
Conflict  0.577⇤⇤⇤  0.386⇤⇤⇤  0.004  0.685⇤⇤⇤  0.328⇤⇤⇤  0.029⇤
(0.101) (0.049) (0.013) (0.127) (0.072) (0.018)
Past 0.464⇤⇤⇤ 0.420⇤⇤⇤ 0.930⇤⇤⇤ 0.360⇤⇤⇤ 0.346⇤⇤⇤ 0.902⇤⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.044) (0.016) (0.050) (0.055) (0.021)
Observations 2,799 2,523 2,934 1,879 1,697 1,925
R2 0.714 0.636 0.975 0.741 0.665 0.978
Adjusted R2 0.681 0.604 0.932 0.691 0.616 0.915
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses below the coe cient estimates.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged. Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
Country dummies not displayed.
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Table A17: Sectoral U.S. FDI and Personal Integrity Rights Protection (OLS with country
dummies)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
panel panel panel
linear linear linear
(1) (2) (3)
Food FDI  0.039 0.011 0.005
(0.027) (0.021) (0.006)
Chemical FDI  0.034 0.024  0.001
(0.041) (0.030) (0.005)
Metal FDI  0.029  0.006  0.009⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.016) (0.004)
Machinery FDI 0.080⇤⇤⇤ 0.005 0.007⇤
(0.029) (0.018) (0.004)
Electrical FDI 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.029) (0.015) (0.004)
Transport FDI 0.016 0.025 0.006
(0.026) (0.017) (0.004)
Wholesale FDI  0.028  0.008  0.006⇤
(0.018) (0.010) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.003 0.013  0.0001
(0.035) (0.019) (0.004)
Trade 0.016  0.023  0.036
(0.220) (0.094) (0.023)
GDP p. capita  0.421⇤⇤⇤  0.018  0.020
(0.105) (0.058) (0.014)
Population 0.899⇤⇤ 0.322 0.242⇤⇤⇤
(0.429) (0.258) (0.073)
Democracy 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.010) (0.002)
Conflict  0.706⇤⇤⇤  0.385⇤⇤⇤  0.024
(0.187) (0.094) (0.024)
Past 0.261⇤⇤⇤ 0.272⇤⇤⇤ 0.867⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.071) (0.034)
Observations 882 806 935
R2 0.710 0.669 0.974
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.573 0.850
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Country dummies not displayed.
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Table A18: Total FDI and Forms of Repression (including civil war)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global FDI p.GDP  0.039⇤⇤  0.039⇤⇤  0.001
(0.017) (0.018) (0.001)
US FDI p. GDP  0.026  0.033 0.002
(0.024) (0.027) (0.002)
Trade 0.093 0.253⇤⇤  0.001 0.140 0.317⇤⇤  0.0005
(0.093) (0.118) (0.007) (0.124) (0.155) (0.008)
GDP p. capita 0.112⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.123⇤⇤ 0.104 0.004
(0.046) (0.053) (0.004) (0.050) (0.064) (0.004)
Population  0.346⇤⇤⇤  0.227⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤⇤  0.348⇤⇤⇤  0.248⇤⇤⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.042) (0.004) (0.042) (0.051) (0.004)
Democracy 0.037⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001)
Min. Dom. Confl.  0.523⇤⇤⇤  0.841⇤⇤⇤ 0.003  0.614⇤⇤⇤  0.784⇤⇤⇤ 0.012
(0.138) (0.165) (0.011) (0.179) (0.215) (0.013)
Maj. Dom. Confl.  1.026⇤⇤⇤  0.825⇤⇤⇤  0.009  1.169⇤⇤⇤  0.973⇤⇤⇤  0.007
(0.159) (0.231) (0.015) (0.253) (0.375) (0.020)
Past 0.980⇤⇤⇤ 1.846⇤⇤⇤ 0.968⇤⇤⇤ 0.948⇤⇤⇤ 1.782⇤⇤⇤ 0.973⇤⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.097) (0.010) (0.056) (0.120) (0.011)
Observations 2,799 2,523 2,934 1,879 1,697 1,925
R2 0.683 0.618 0.972 0.691 0.626 0.974
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.970
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Robustness check: dummy for international and domestic conflict is replaced by major and minor domestic conflict.
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors.
OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
Ordered Logit Models: Nagelkerke R-squared.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
Years included: 1983-2010.
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Table A19: Sectoral FDI and Repression (including civil war)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel
linear
(1) (2) (3)
Food FDI  0.023  0.001 0.004
(0.038) (0.045) (0.004)
Chemical FDI  0.050  0.047  0.003
(0.030) (0.042) (0.004)
Metal FDI  0.031  0.066⇤  0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.038) (0.004)
Machinery FDI 0.026  0.026 0.005
(0.037) (0.032) (0.004)
Electrical FDI  0.001 0.045 0.006⇤
(0.028) (0.034) (0.003)
Transport FDI 0.013 0.004 0.003
(0.027) (0.036) (0.003)
Wholesale FDI  0.023  0.003  0.006⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.027) (0.003)
Depository FDI 0.051 0.115⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.028) (0.002)
Trade 0.106 0.365⇤⇤ 0.011
(0.142) (0.181) (0.012)
GDP p. capita 0.059 0.076 0.006
(0.090) (0.080) (0.007)
Population  0.386⇤⇤⇤  0.204⇤⇤  0.007
(0.082) (0.093) (0.008)
Democracy 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤ 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.001)
Min. Dom. Confl.  0.577⇤⇤  1.024⇤⇤⇤  0.002
(0.225) (0.233) (0.018)
Maj. Dom. Confl.  1.394⇤⇤⇤  1.046⇤⇤  0.020
(0.305) (0.412) (0.030)
Past 0.812⇤⇤⇤ 1.645⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.063) (0.163) (0.014)
Observations 882 806 935
R2 0.639 0.614 0.967
Adjusted R2 0.951
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Overall conflict replaced by major and minor domestic conflict.
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors.
OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
Ordered Logit Models: Nagelkerke R-squared.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
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Table A20: Binary Decomposition of Democracy (CIRI and PTS)
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Global FDI p.GDP  0.030⇤  0.033⇤
(0.017) (0.019)
U.S. FDI p.GDP  0.024  0.030
(0.024) (0.026)
Trade 0.122 0.337⇤⇤⇤ 0.182 0.385⇤⇤
(0.098) (0.125) (0.136) (0.178)
GDP p. capita 0.053 0.054 0.069 0.061
(0.048) (0.055) (0.058) (0.070)
Population  0.331⇤⇤⇤  0.227⇤⇤⇤  0.333⇤⇤⇤  0.244⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.038) (0.048) (0.046)
Democracy=-9  0.020 0.251 0.202 0.604
(0.182) (0.346) (0.320) (0.480)
Democracy=-8 0.223 0.441 0.913⇤ 0.272
(0.256) (0.353) (0.502) (0.523)
Democracy=-7  0.099 0.379  0.322 0.051
(0.200) (0.327) (0.226) (0.453)
Democracy=-6 0.008 0.364 0.166 0.329
(0.216) (0.344) (0.214) (0.466)
Democracy=-5  0.188 0.004  0.401  0.501
(0.347) (0.438) (0.465) (0.541)
Democracy=-4  0.106 0.202  0.096 0.158
(0.244) (0.345) (0.229) (0.461)
Democracy=-3 0.099  0.108  0.026  0.563
(0.242) (0.415) (0.240) (0.546)
Democracy=-2  0.094 0.022  0.163  0.080
(0.289) (0.396) (0.362) (0.531)
Democracy=-1  0.203 0.376 0.023 0.511
(0.243) (0.385) (0.309) (0.616)
Democracy=-0  0.386  0.754  0.463  1.040
(0.397) (0.486) (0.379) (0.638)
Democracy=1 0.137 0.423 0.400 0.371
(0.250) (0.425) (0.281) (0.571)
Democracy=2 0.762⇤⇤ 0.591 1.033⇤⇤ 0.567
(0.357) (0.402) (0.438) (0.518)
Democracy=3 0.136 0.014 0.453⇤⇤⇤  0.039
(0.229) (0.376) (0.167) (0.517)
Democracy=4 0.097  0.036 0.087 0.032
(0.273) (0.350) (0.276) (0.476)
Democracy=5 0.046 0.005 0.231 0.014
(0.274) (0.399) (0.316) (0.519)
Democracy=6 0.330 0.351 0.268 0.252
(0.241) (0.327) (0.205) (0.451)
Democracy=7 0.325 0.295 0.310 0.113
(0.241) (0.370) (0.224) (0.502)
Democracy=8 0.565⇤⇤⇤ 0.463 0.598⇤⇤⇤ 0.285
(0.210) (0.345) (0.180) (0.463)
Democracy=9 0.583⇤⇤ 0.793⇤⇤ 0.626⇤⇤⇤ 0.642
(0.232) (0.356) (0.197) (0.465)
Democracy=10 0.998⇤⇤⇤ 1.467⇤⇤ 1.210⇤⇤⇤ 1.227⇤
(0.303) (0.581) (0.310) (0.645)
Conflict  0.705⇤⇤⇤  0.974⇤⇤⇤  0.912⇤⇤⇤  0.992⇤⇤⇤
(0.136) (0.147) (0.168) (0.193)
Past 0.974⇤⇤⇤ 1.790⇤⇤⇤ 0.935⇤⇤⇤ 1.717⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.092) (0.053) (0.109)
Observations 2,799 2,523 1,879 1,697
R2 0.685 0.627 0.697 0.635
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors.
FDIpGDP, GDPpc, population, trade are logged.
Years included: 1983-2010.
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Table A21: Binary Decomposition of Democracy (Latent Scores by Fariss)
Dependent variable:
Latent Scores
(1) (2)
Global FDI p.GDP  0.001
(0.001)
U.S. FDI p.GDP 0.002
(0.002)
Trade 0.0003 0.0004
(0.007) (0.009)
GDP p. capita 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
Population  0.015⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004)
Democracy=-9 0.020 0.024
(0.026) (0.032)
Democracy=-8 0.011 0.051⇤
(0.026) (0.030)
Democracy=-7 0.009  0.040
(0.022) (0.026)
Democracy=-6 0.029  0.010
(0.022) (0.026)
Democracy=-5  0.004  0.070⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.027)
Democracy=-4 0.035 0.001
(0.028) (0.026)
Democracy=-3 0.019  0.003
(0.030) (0.033)
Democracy=-2 0.014  0.015
(0.025) (0.029)
Democracy=-1 0.025 0.017
(0.026) (0.035)
Democracy=-0 0.031 0.001
(0.036) (0.040)
Democracy=1 0.101⇤⇤⇤ 0.073⇤
(0.035) (0.038)
Democracy=2 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.083⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.033)
Democracy=3 0.035 0.021
(0.032) (0.032)
Democracy=4  0.016  0.030
(0.024) (0.031)
Democracy=5 0.021 0.016
(0.026) (0.022)
Democracy=6 0.036  0.005
(0.025) (0.027)
Democracy=7 0.030  0.001
(0.022) (0.021)
Democracy=8 0.048⇤⇤ 0.014
(0.020) (0.018)
Democracy=9 0.040⇤ 0.021
(0.023) (0.023)
Democracy=10 0.024  0.017
(0.021) (0.026)
Conflict  0.002  0.003
(0.011) (0.013)
Past 0.969⇤⇤⇤ 0.971⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011)
Observations 2,934 1,925
R2 0.972 0.975
Adjusted R2 0.964 0.961
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Missing Data
Table A22: Displaying Missing Data
Variable Missing Obs. Missingness %
Conflict 158 3.45
Population 169 3.69
Latent Scores (Fariss) 453 9.89
GDP p. capita 615 13.42
Global FDI p. GDP 694 15.15
Trade 947 20.67
CIRI Phys. Integrity 1, 075 23.46
Democracy 1, 304 28.46
PTS Amnesty 1, 392 30.38
Electrical FDI p. GDP 1, 838 40.11
Machinery FDI p. GDP 1, 880 41.03
Transport FDI p. GDP 1, 904 41.55
Metal FDI p. GDP 1, 986 43.34
Chemical FDI p. GDP 2, 034 44.39
Food FDI p. GDP 2, 075 45.29
Whole. Trade FDI p. GDP 2, 155 47.03
U.S. Total FDI p. GDP 2, 189 47.77
Deposit. Inst. FDI p. GDP 2, 473 53.97
Employm. Services 3, 126 68.22
Employm. Industry 3, 126 68.22
Number of total rows: 4,582.
Table A23: Missingness Analysis for Sectoral FDI (Logistic Regression)
Dependent variable:
Food Chemical Metals Machin. Electr. Transp. Wholes. Tr. Deposit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trade  0.244⇤⇤⇤  0.702⇤⇤⇤  0.661⇤⇤⇤  0.831⇤⇤⇤  0.979⇤⇤⇤  0.543⇤⇤⇤  0.486⇤⇤⇤  0.382⇤⇤⇤
(0.090) (0.095) (0.092) (0.098) (0.100) (0.095) (0.092) (0.081)
GDP pc  0.390⇤⇤⇤  0.328⇤⇤⇤  0.267⇤⇤⇤  0.281⇤⇤⇤  0.354⇤⇤⇤  0.407⇤⇤⇤  0.377⇤⇤⇤  0.085⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.032)
Population  0.311⇤⇤⇤  0.540⇤⇤⇤  0.372⇤⇤⇤  0.464⇤⇤⇤  0.475⇤⇤⇤  0.302⇤⇤⇤  0.475⇤⇤⇤  0.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.028)
Democracy  0.039⇤⇤⇤  0.036⇤⇤⇤  0.035⇤⇤⇤  0.064⇤⇤⇤  0.050⇤⇤⇤  0.061⇤⇤⇤  0.039⇤⇤⇤  0.024⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Conflict  0.294⇤⇤⇤  0.108  0.081  0.067  0.048  0.028 0.135  0.255⇤⇤
(0.109) (0.114) (0.109) (0.115) (0.115) (0.111) (0.109) (0.099)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Dependent variables: Dummies indicate when original sectoral FDI is missing (= 1)
GDPpc, population, trade are logged. Number of obs.: 3,005.
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Table A30: Sample Size Analysis for Regression Models
Necessary Sample Size to Detect
Small E↵ects Medium E↵ects
Baseline Models
14 Predictors (all sectors in same model) 914 120
7 Predictors (sectors entered separately) 717 95
Models Incl. Sectoral Employment
16 Predictors (all sectors in same model) 960 125
9 Predictors (sectors entered separately) 781 103
Note: Using function pwr.f2.test() from R library{pwr}.
Cohen’s f2= 0.02 for small and f2=0.15 for medium e↵ects.
Significance level 0.05; power 0.8.
Table A31: Power Analysis for Regression (Ideal Power at Least 0.8)
Power of existing sample to detect
small e↵ects med. e↵ects
Baseline Models
14 Pred., 935 obs. (all sectors in same model) 0.81 1
7 Pred., 1562-2093 obs. (sectors entered sep.) 0.99-1 1
Models Incl. Sectoral Employment
16 Pred., 326 obs. (all sectors in same model) 0.29 1
9 Pred., 663-956 obs. (sectors entered sep.) 0.72-0.89 1
Note: Using function pwr.f2.test() from R library{pwr}.
Cohen’s f2= 0.02 for small and f2=0.15 for medium e↵ects.
Significance level 0.05. Observation no. from Latent Scores models.
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Table A32: Sectoral FDI and Personal Integrity Rights Protection (1983-2010), including
non-OECD and OECD countries
Dependent variable:
CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores CIRI Integrity PTS Amnesty Latent Scores
logistic logistic panel logistic logistic panel
linear linear
Baseline Sector Size Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food FDI 0.002  0.002 0.003  0.017  0.013 0.001
(0.032) (0.036) (0.003) (0.051) (0.073) (0.004)
Chemical FDI 0.013 0.022 0.001  0.018 0.049 0.003
(0.030) (0.040) (0.004) (0.047) (0.090) (0.005)
Metal FDI  0.015  0.066⇤⇤  0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.001  0.105⇤⇤  0.004
(0.035) (0.033) (0.003) (0.040) (0.052) (0.003)
Machinery FDI 0.040 0.008 0.004 0.054 0.017 0.0003
(0.031) (0.027) (0.003) (0.042) (0.048) (0.003)
Electrical FDI  0.012 0.028 0.004  0.003 0.053 0.0001
(0.030) (0.027) (0.002) (0.040) (0.043) (0.003)
Transport FDI  0.042  0.045 0.001  0.016  0.034 0.004
(0.034) (0.028) (0.003) (0.044) (0.045) (0.003)
Wholesale FDI  0.004 0.003  0.005⇤ 0.065⇤⇤ 0.020  0.001
(0.020) (0.026) (0.003) (0.029) (0.049) (0.004)
Depository FDI  0.008 0.055⇤ 0.002  0.059 0.005  0.003
(0.032) (0.028) (0.002) (0.047) (0.058) (0.004)
Trade 0.005 0.117 0.006  0.055 0.020 0.010
(0.132) (0.190) (0.012) (0.152) (0.274) (0.016)
GDP p. capita 0.258⇤⇤⇤ 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.010 0.518⇤⇤⇤ 0.499⇤⇤⇤ 0.013
(0.077) (0.073) (0.007) (0.115) (0.157) (0.011)
Population  0.274⇤⇤⇤  0.178⇤⇤  0.003  0.290⇤⇤⇤  0.283⇤  0.007
(0.069) (0.082) (0.006) (0.106) (0.146) (0.010)
Democracy 0.067⇤⇤⇤ 0.045⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤ 0.075⇤⇤⇤ 0.020  0.00003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.018) (0.002)
Conflict  0.644⇤⇤⇤  0.769⇤⇤⇤  0.009  1.076⇤⇤⇤  0.153  0.018
(0.200) (0.265) (0.012) (0.387) (0.335) (0.019)
Employm. Services  0.293  0.096 0.035
(0.360) (0.642) (0.037)
Employm. Industry  0.481⇤  0.234  0.036⇤
(0.253) (0.333) (0.020)
Past 0.954⇤⇤⇤ 2.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.974⇤⇤⇤ 1.194⇤⇤⇤ 2.391⇤⇤⇤ 0.977⇤⇤⇤
(0.064) (0.162) (0.010) (0.100) (0.159) (0.012)
Observations 1,171 1,039 1,224 602 511 604
R2 0.711 0.690 0.980 0.763 0.733 0.986
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.959
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Ordered logit with country-clustered standard errors. OLS with panel corrected standard errors.
All FDI is divided by GDP, then logged. GDP p. capita, population and trade are logged.
Past is the lagged dependent variable (LDV).
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